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Judicial Notice and "Indisputables"
Ralph Slovenko*
U NDER THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM of trying cases, the litigant and
not the trier is responsible for gathering and presenting the
evidence. However, under the doctrine of judicial notice, the
tribunal accepts the existence of certain evidence without the
necessity of a party offering formal proof.1
The test for judicial notice is usually said to be "the indis-
putability of the facts." For example, in the California case of
Varcoe v. Lee,2 the defendant was charged with violating a city
ordinance which was applicable to the business district." The de-
fendant drove his automobile along Mission Street, in San Fran-
cisco, when approaching the crossing of Twenty-first Street, at a
greater speed than fifteen miles an hour. No evidence was of-
fered that this location was in the "business district." The ques-
tion was whether the court was entitled to take judicial notice of
the character of the street. The court said that judicial notice
could not be taken "if there were any possibility of dispute as to
whether or not that character was such as to constitute it a busi-
ness district within the definition of the statute applicable" (em-
phasis added).3 The court said that the test "in any particular
case where it is sought to avoid or excuse the production of evi-
dence is: Is it certain and indisputable?" 4
As a result of this formulation, the court, when it believes
that it has hold of an "indisputable," does not allow the adversely
affected litigant to introduce contrary evidence, "for its produc-
* Assoc. Prof. of Law, Tulane University School of Law.
1 Thus, a party is not required to prove formally that water runs downhill,
that light travels 186,427 miles per second, that vitamin D acts as do ultra-
violet rays, that minerals cannot be located with a divining rod, that
Bulgaria was an independent kingdom and that a native of that country
was not a citizen of Russia, or that in 1940 "existing conditions in Poland
are serious." See cases cited in Note, 13 Rocky Mt. L. R. 374 (1941). When
the United States Supreme Court in 1959 enjoined the steel strike, Justice
Douglas, dissenting, said the case should be returned to the district court
"for particularized findings as to how the steel strike imperils the 'national
health' and what plants need to be reopened to produce the small quantity
of steel now needed for the national safety . . . I am unwilling to takejudicial notice that it requires 100% of the workers to produce the steel
needed for national defense when 99% of the output is devoted to purposes
entirely unconnected with defense projects." United Steelworkers of
America v. United States, 80 S. Ct. 1, 11-12 (1959).
2 180 Cal. 338, 181 P. 223 (1919).
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
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tion cannot add or aid." 5 The court also instructs the jury to
consider judicially noticed data as settled and definitive data from
which the decision is to be drawn. In the case of State v. Law-
rence," the defendant was on trial for larceny. The prosecutor
did not introduce evidence of the value of the property stolen, a
one-year-old Ford automobile. The court took judicial notice that
the property was worth more than fifty dollars, the statutory
minimum for the crime of grand larceny. The court thereupon
instructed the jury that the property was worth more than fifty
dollars, and that if the defendant were guilty of a crime, he was
guilty of grand larceny. The return by the jury of a verdict
of guilty of petty larceny was thus ruled out by the instruction
of the trial court.
In view of these results, the judicial test of "indisputability"
as the criterion for judicial notice merits analysis. In the history
of philosophy, we learn, Bishop Berkeley maintained that sen-
sations give one a collection of ideas: the existing world is de-
pendent upon the mind. Berkeley's subjective metaphysics moved
into David Hume's metaphysical scepticism. Hume went one step
further than Berkeley and "idealized" causation. It was the con-
tention of Hume that causation is an association of ideas, a con-
vention or convenient fiction of the mind. Since law implies
causation, the philosophy of Hume represents an attack on the
so-called "laws of nature." Hume drew the conclusion that
there could be no such thing as a law of nature because the very
principle of causality is nothing but a set of happenings, con-
nections in our experience, in which one impression succeeds
another according to our habit of expectation. Hume maintained
that when we interpret the phenomena of experience as manifest-
ing universal causal connections, we are thereby reading into
the phenomena what they themselves do not contain, but that
with which they have been invested by our thought. Granted
that necessity and universality are found everywhere in our
consciousness, what reason have we, Hume would ask, for as-
serting that these characteristics are also the attributes of things
themselves? We observe regular patterns or successions in na-
ture. On the basis of these patterns, we "jump" to the idea of
cause and effect or necessary connection. Causation is acceptance
through custom-sensations simply give a sequence in time and
5 Ibid.
6 234 P. 2d 600 (Utah 1951).
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not causation. We have been in the habit of expecting things to
happen in the future in the same order as they have happened in
the past, and we expect them to continue to do so.7
Immanuel Kant faced the question: If Hume is right how
can scientific thought have a rational foundation? Kant's posi-
tion was that our minds give laws to nature. Scientific knowledge,
Kant maintained, is concerned exclusively with phenomena, that
is to say, with the "outside" of things. Phenomena, however, can
be known only in so far as they conform to certain laws of our
own mind. Such laws are presupposed in every act of knowl-
edge. It is we who "work up" into coherent objects or things
the multiplicity or "manifold" presented to our senses. The
mind, according to Kant, has certain forms into which experience
must fall, so that one can be certain in advance that our ex-
perience will be subject to the structure and laws of space and
time, because these are forms of our sensibility; and subject also
to the categories of substance and attribute, of cause and effect,
et cetera, because we cannot think at all without making a
constitutive use of these categories. These forms and categories
are given in advance of experience, and every thing that occurs
in experience must take on these forms.8 However, we cannot
tell in advance what the cause of an event will be; we can only
know in advance that every event must have some cause. The
empirical part of our experience, the content of our sensuous
experience, will all fall into these forms; but forms do not de-
termine what the content will be. They determine only how we
shall experience that content, and this means, even for Kant, that
our expressions of the "laws of nature" may not be universally
necessary.
The positivist tradition in philosophy, insofar as phenomenol-
ogy goes, has its principal origin in the work of Hume and
Kant. This philosophy has involved an analysis of the nature
and limitations of the knowledge attained by the science of phe-
nomena. Basically, the positivist conception of these sciences is to
the effect that the knowledge gained through their investigative
method, which chiefly involves a mathematical reading of sensible
phenomena, cannot penetrate to the substance of things so as to
7 See von Mises, Positivism 156 (1951).
8 See Boutroux, La Philsophie de Kant (1926); Clark, An Introduction to
Kant's Philosophy (1925); Ewing, A short Commentary on Kant's Critique
of Pure Reason (1950); Mead, Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth
Century (1936).
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constitute an ontological knowledge of nature but rather is con-
fined to describing the connection and relations among sensible
phenomena. The faculty which is able to synthesize natural phe-
nomena cannot penetrate to the essence or inside of things. Ac-
cording to this view, the certitudes attained by the sciences are
relative to the data upon which they are based and thus cannot
be considered final or absolute since new data must inevitably be
discovered. 9
The courts, as we have pointed out, maintain that judicial
notice is taken of those matters which are "indisputable" and that
the litigants, perforce, are not allowed to dispute the "indispu-
table." The legal meaning of the term "indisputable," and the
way it is distinguished from the disputable, is naive, at least,
philosophically and scientifically naive. If "laws of nature" can-
not be considered final or absolute, as philosophers and scientists
have pointed out, what then can be considered to be indisputable?
The "facts of history" are subject to even more dispute, as they
are elicited from past events the knowledge of which is par-
ticularly hypothetical in nature.
It is customary for logicians to distinguish between analytic
and synthetic judgments. It is in the analytic judgment where
we can find the "indisputable." The analytic proposition is neces-
sary and certain, for it simply records our determination to use
words in a certain fashion. The predicate of the judgment is
contained in the concept of the subject, as for example, a triangle
has three angles. Analytic judgments are universally and neces-
sarily true simply because no more is said in the predicate than
what is stated in the subject. It is a tautology (word formed from
two Greek words tauto, the same, and logia, to say), a statement
of the same, a repetition.
The synthetic judgment, on the other hand, unlike the analy-
tic proposition which is necessary and certain, is continually sub-
ject to the test of further experience. The reason why the
analytic proposition cannot be confused in experience is that it
does not make any assertion about the empirical world. The
validity of the analytic judgment depends solely on the definitions
of the symbols it contains, whereas the validity of a synthetic
judgment is determined by experience.
9 See Russell, The Problems of Philosophy 96, 101, 107 (1912); see also
Boutroux, the Contingency of the Laws of Nature (1916); Maritain,
Philosophy of Nature 45-72 (1951); Russell, Our Knowledge of the External
World 221-22 (1915).
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Science of the present day does not claim absoluteness or in-
fallibility, or "iron laws of necessity." Certitude in science is
alien to the spirit of science. It does not regard its own findings
as final. The proposition that "all bodies heavier than air fall to
the ground" must now contain a reservation with respect to the
possibility of aviation. In no area of experience, can a proposi-
tion that is not a tautology be not subject to check by future
observations. In no case can statements be asserted about reality
in the form of "eternal laws." Science has changed its attitude
from a philosophy of fixed laws to a philosophy of hypotheses. 10
Natural science is not dogmatic. Dogmatism assumes the possi-
bility of certain knowledge, whereas hypotheses yield probable
knowledge." The history of natural science has been well de-
scribed as a history of discarded hypotheses. Except among jur-
ists, ordinary people, and dialectical materialists, the view that
we do not know for certain the truth of any empirical statement
is very popular. C. I. Lewis says, "All empirical knowledge is
probable only"; 12 Bertrand Russell says, "We have found reason
to doubt external preception, in the full-blooded sense in which
common-sense accepts it" 13 and "we can never be completely cer-
tain that any given proposition is true"; 14 A. J. Ayer says, "No
10 See Nagel, Sovereign Reason 304-306 (1954); Feibleman, Viennese
Positivism in the United States, 4 Tulane Studies in Philosophy 31 (1955);
Lee, A Chriticism of the Marxian Interpretation of History, 1 Tulane Studies
in Philosophy 95 (1952); Royce, The Search for Meaning, 47 American
Scientist 515 (1959).
11 It has been customary in the history of philosophy for those who found
no dogmatic or absolute certainty of their knowledge to become skeptics.
It is essential to distinguish hypothetical or probable knowledge from
scepticism, which doubts the possibility of knowledge. Science of the
present time does not claim absoluteness or infallibility, or "iron laws of
necessity." Science, at the beginning of the twentieth century, changed its
attitude from a philosophy of fixed laws to a philosophy of hypotheses.
Hypotheses yield probable knowledge. Formally there is no essential
difference between a scientific "law," "theory," and "hypothesis." The
distinction between them depends on a difference in the degree to which
they are based on evidence and have been confirmed by evidence. In
the broader, more fundamental use of the terms, all generalizations are
theoretic and theory is hypothetical. See Lee, Theoretic Knowledge and
Hypothesis, 57 Psychological Rev. 31 (1950); see also Cornforth, The
Theory of Knowledge 153 (1955). The change in attitude of science from
a philosophy of fixed laws to a philosophy of hypotheses does not preclude
reliable knowledge as a basis for decision or action. Knowledge need not
be infallible to be genuine knowledge.
'Z Lewis, Mind and the World Order 309 (1929).
13 Russell, Philosophy 10 (1927); see also Russell's Introduction to Wittgen-
stein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 16 (1955).
14 Russell, An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth 166 (1940).
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genuine synthetic proposition can be absolutely certain" 15 and
"Statements about material things are not conclusively verifi-
able." 16
Contemporary dialectical materialists cling to the theory of
absolute and objective truth. It is their contention that to every
scientific theory or hypothesis there is a corresponding objectivity
which is absolutely true in nature, and with greater and greater
exactitude, these objective laws become known. I" The acceptance
of the existence of objective laws of nature as a chain of neces-
sity, however, does not require a dogmatic position. Under
either the subjective or objective position the door cannot be
closed to further examination. To the subjectivists, it is asked:
When is an hypothesis verified? To the objectivists, it is asked:
When is a law established in a "pure form"? The answer for
both is the same: the examination is never finished. The possi-
bility of continued testing must always remain open, since new
evidence may become available at any time.
The position that "all empirical statements are hypotheses"
admittedly goes against "common sense." The statement that "I
had dinner an hour ago," or that "Elephants do not come out of
pianos," is empirical, and it might appear ridiculous to call it an
hypothesis. It is necessary to point out that when a philosopher
says that all empirical statements are hypotheses, he means that
they do not possess logical certainty, as does the a priori state-
ment that "40 minus 20 equals 20." The empirical proposition
does not have a self-contradictory negative. The denial of an
empirical proposition is a logical possibility. The philosopher
therefore says that empirical statements do not have absolute
certainty but at most high probability.' 7
"Probable knowledge" is not an elliptical or oxymoronic
statement. It is wrong for a jurist to assume that, since no one
can know reality with certainty, "no evidence is sufficient for
establishing the identity of the criminal." Probable knowledge
really is knowledge. In the case of Nicketta v. National Tea Co.,' 5
the plaintiff suggested that because science is progressive and
new discoveries are constantly being made, no scientific fact how-
ever well established should be judicially noticed. This position
15 Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic 127 (1936). See also p. 132: "Empirical
statements are one and all hypotheses."
16 Ayer, The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge 239 (1940).
17 See Engels, Dialectics of Nature 158-160 (1940).
18 338 111. App. 159, 87 N.E. 2d 30 (1949).
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is without merit. A scientific philosophy of hypothesis does not
preclude reliable knowledge as a basis for decision or action. It
is the contention of this paper that judicial notice is properly
taken of well-attested propositions, thereby dispensing with the
burden of formal proof on the part of the proponent, but, since
"laws of nature" and "facts of history" are simply hypotheses,
the door should not be shut to dispute. Synthetic judgments, re-
quiring actual observation for validity, are always subject to
verification and reverification. Under its view of things, however,
the court excludes itself as a place for investigation. The sug-
gestion of "indisputables" commits the supreme sin against the
scientific spirit: It blocks the road of inquiry. 19
The sole purpose of the doctrine of judicial notice is to relieve
one of the parties of the burden of resorting to the usual forms
of evidence in order to establish a point of general knowledge.
In practice (life is short), it is not possible to prove everything.
Trials would be impossible without the concept of judicial notice.
As Thayer put it, "In conducting a process of judicial reason-
ing, as of other reasoning, not a step can be taken without as-
suming something which has not been proved." 20 The doctrine
of judicial notice is fundamentally based on practical convenience
and necessity, and to say that a court will take judicial notice of
a fact is merely another way of saying that the usual forms of
evidence will be dispensed with. The formal proof of all points
involved in a trial would encumber beyond belief the process of
litigation. A party need not have to prove something which is
generally recognized. However, the view that the facts of the
world depend upon the frame of reference means for the judicial
enquiry that the adversely affected party should be allowed to
bring forward a viewpoint contrary to the one judicially noticed,
and the jury should have the right of making the final determi-
nation when the validity of a proposition is called into question.
Another way is always possible. One is more likely to entertain
another way if one thinks in terms of probabilities rather than in
terms of indisputables.
The court of law, of course, can entertain only those posi-
tions of the adversely affected party which have probative or
convincing value, for it must as a practical matter get on with
19 See Ayres, The Vale Economy, in Lepley (ed.), Value, A Cooperative
Inquiry 59 (1949).
20 Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence 279 (1898).
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the case and must therefore be governed by rules of practical
efficacy.21 However, the doctrine of judicial notice must not be
treated with a sense of inviolability. It should be applied flexi-
bly.22
The judicial notice provisions of the Model Code of Evidence
and the Uniform Rules of Evidence leave much to be desired.
They provide that judicial notice is taken of facts which "are
capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to
easily accessible sources of indisputable accuracy." 23 In a com-
ment, it is said: "If a matter falls within the domain of judicial
knowledge, it is beyond the realm of dispute." 24 The thinking of
the Model Code and the Uniform Rules is antiquated.
21 Suppose a state statute requires dance halls to have a license in all
towns over 500 population. The defendant is prosecuted for running a
dance hall without a license. The court takes judicial notice that the town
is over 500 population. But the defendant should be entitled to prove that
the population is under 500. Compare State v. Kincaid, 133 Ore. 95, 285
P. 1105 (1930). The defendant's contention may have force in Slippery
Rock, but not in Chicago or New Orleans, unless they have been deserted.
22 The recommendation is also appropriate for the opinion rule. See Slo-
venko, The Opinion Rule and Wittgenstein's Tractatus, 14 U. Miami L. R.
1 (1959).
23 The judicial notice provisions of the Model Code and the Uniform Rules
are essentially the same. See Rules 9 to 12 of the Uniform Rules and Rules
801 to 806 of the Model Code.
24 Model Code of Evidence rule 804 (2, 3), comment (1942).
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol10/iss1/17
